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This study is motivated by frequent calls to harmonize labor standards across countries, which 
result from the fear that economic integration (and the accompanying liberalization of trade 
flows) will lead to an erosion of working conditions, as countries deliberately try to reduce 
labor standards in order to maintain competitiveness.  We examine the linkages between labor 
standards and economic integration in the European Union (EU) and, in particular, investigate 
the following questions.  First, whether the conventional wisdom that labor standards are 
important determinants of trade performance holds, and second whether there has been a 
“race to the bottom” of standards across countries with deeper integration.  We follow a 
neoclassical factor-proportions framework to conduct our empirical investigation, and unlike 
previous studies, which rely mostly on cross-sectional data, we use a fully-fledged panel data 
set to explore the relationship between labor standards and export performance.  Our 
estimates based on data for the period 1980-2001 for EU-15 countries provides mixed 
evidence regarding the conventional wisdom, and we find that trade performance is largely 
based on factor endowments.  We also find mixed evidence for “σ-convergence” in labor 
standards. 
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This paper examines the conventional wisdom that globalization will undermine the ability 
of national governments to set economic and social policy.  More precisely, it considers the 
linkages between economic integration
1 and labor standards in the European Union over the 
period 1980-2001.  Questions of trade and labor standards are not new and have been widely 
analyzed, both theoretically and empirically, especially in a North-South context.  The 
question remains whether as economies become increasingly integrated, ceteris paribus, 
countries with lower labor standards obtain an unfair advantage in trade due to lower labor 
costs.  Much of the literature argues that labor standards matter and that countries that have 
relatively low labor standards obtain “unfair” gains from trade.  It should therefore not come 
as a surprise that countries such as the United States and France have been pushing for the 
inclusion of labor standards at the WTO level for a number of years.   
Developing countries view this argument as disguised protectionism and as being 
equally unfair as it will erode their competitiveness, which is largely based on labor costs.  
While this issue has been extensively analyzed in a North-South framework, its importance 
has been overlooked among developed nations that are characterized by similar political 
systems, and that are part of regional trade agreements.  In a report released by the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) in February 2004 entitled “A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities 
for All”, it is argued that stronger action is required to ensure respect for core labor 
standards in global production systems.  No attention, however, is given to this debate 
                                                           
1 The term economic integration is preferred to globalization as it is more precise and helps us to consider 
trade flows specifically. 
  1within the context of existing regional trade agreements among (mostly) developed 
countries.  
  This paper tries to fill some of the gap in this literature by considering the linkages 
that exist between labor standards and economic integration in the European Union.  The 
European Union (EU) represents, in our view, the ideal candidate for such an analysis, and 
for the following reasons.  From a regional economic agreement among six neighboring 
states in the 1950s, the EU has evolved into a supranational organization of twenty-five 
countries across the European continent.  It currently stands as the largest trading area in the 
world, and European integration has proceeded the furthest, especially with the creation of 
the Single European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Labor, capital, 
goods and services flow freely across borders, and most members of the EU share a 
common currency, the EURO.  Nations and societies with different norms and rules that 
govern their individual labor markets have thus been brought into closer and more frequent 
contact with one another as a result of integration.  Even though labor standards and labor 
market regulations are a purely domestic matter, and presumably shaped by domestic interest 
groups, voters and national governments, one could argue that policies in one nation are 
now more likely to have welfare redistribution effects and repercussions for levels of labor 
protection in other nations.  The recent addition of 10 new members to the EU in May 2004 
which are at different levels of economic development, and the possibility of further 
enlargement in 2007 (which includes Turkey) poses new challenges that also need to be 
addressed. It is noteworthy that freedom of movement for labor has not generally been 
granted to the 10 new members, this being phased in gradually in the original 15 members 
vis-à-vis the newcomers. Fears of pressure on wages and erosion of labor standards wrought 
by the “Polish plumber” played an important role in the recent, indecisive German federal 
  2election (September, 2005), and also animated opposition to the initiation of accession talks 
with Turkey (October, 2005).  These concerns are evidently of political import and worthy 
of further investigation. 
Furthermore, and on a more pragmatic note, the EU has been in existence for 
enough years: the availability of reliable data, both cross-section and time series, makes 
empirical analysis possible.  Regarding labor standards themselves, the EU has traditionally 
tried to ensure a “decent” working environment throughout member countries, by setting 
some common minimum rules on working conditions, and promoting a safe and healthy 
work environment, but leaving some room for preservation of policy independence and 
diversity (Gitterman 2003). 
In this paper, we follow the OECD (1996) and define labor standards as norms, 
rules and conventions that govern working conditions and industrial relations.  Such a 
definition captures all the institutional elements of labor markets such as minimum wages, 
occupational health and safety standards, number of hours worked, rates of occupational 
injuries, and unionization rates.
2  One would presumably expect labor standards to be a 
driven by both a country's level of development and its respect for international conventions 
defined by the ILO that it has ratified.  Ultimately, the choice of a particular standard is a 
domestic policy choice, which suggests to us as economists that diversity of standards should 
be the norm rather than the exception.  The theory of commercial policy proposes that gains 
from trade arise from diversity, and that an enforced harmonization or “straitjacketing” of 
countries to a particular standard, whether higher or lower than would have been chosen 
                                                           
2 The literature on labor standards often refers to core labor standards, which are represented by eight ILO 
conventions defining four fundamental rights at work, and they are supported internationally, which implies 
that they apply regardless of a country's level of economic development.  
  3otherwise, will generally be harmful to welfare.
3  Hence, the argument that countries should 
restrict access to markets when there are suspicions that products are being made under 
poor working conditions is one that needs to be dealt with caution.   
This paper thus seeks to answer two questions related to the issue of economic 
integration and labor standards.  First, the paper tries to ascertain empirically whether 
countries with high labor standards experience a loss of competitiveness measured by export 
performance; in other words, to what extent are trade flows determined by labor standards 
when one controls for natural determinants of comparative advantage.  The conventional 
wisdom argues that countries with lower labor standards should enjoy a better export 
performance; this should be even more felt in the case of labor-intensive production and 
exports.  Second, the paper examines the “race to the bottom” argument that low labor 
standards provide an unfair source of comparative advantage, and that increasing imports 
from low-standards countries will have an adverse impact on wages and working conditions 
in high-standards countries.   With the free movement of capital, the argument runs, new 
capital investment will flow to regions where labor standards are lower, and wages cheaper, 
therefore placing downward pressure on domestic standards as erstwhile high-standard 
countries ratchet standards downward in order to remain competitive.  This argument, 
however, is a theoretical possibility, not an empirical necessity, and in need of further 
investigation. In so doing, we will address the issue of convergence or harmonization of 
standards across countries as a result of increased economic integration.   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly surveys the history of 
labor standards in the European Union.  Section 3 discusses existing theoretical and 
                                                           
3 Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996) furnish an argument that purports to show that harmonization of 
standards may in certain circumstances be welfare-improving in a standard model, but Dehejia (1998) 
  4empirical work.  Section 4 presents the models tested and empirical evidence related to the 
two questions outlined in the previous paragraph.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Labor Standards in the European Union - A Brief History
4 
 
International labor standards as we know them today originate from the aftermath of the 
Industrial Revolution in Great Britain at the beginning of the 19
th century.  Attempts were 
made to offset the negative externalities associated with industrialization in order to protect 
members of the working class and these were generally met by opposition from employers 
even though there were benefits (arguably) accruing to the latter.
5  Standards pertaining to 
minimum age and maximum hours worked were thus applied to women and children as they 
were believed to be unable to decide for themselves, had very few (if any) political rights and 
were typically not members of bargaining units.  Historians of labor standards refer to the 
English Factory Act of 1802 introduced by Sir Robert Peel as the starting point, which set 
limits on hours of work and asked that education and religious instruction be provided to 
apprentices.  Subsequent legislation in the 19
th century expanded coverage and requirements.  
Over the course of the 19
th century, most European nations had standards in place for 
factory labor, and at least initially, they established their own standards independently of one 
another.  Colonies were, however, excluded from these regulations. 
  Parallel to this evolution of national labor standards, there were some attempts to 
establish international labor standards as well.   As discussed in Engerman (2003), there were 
concerns about the costs that a country would have to face if it unilaterally set standards for 
itself and the resulting loss in competitiveness; some also argued in favor of international 
                                                                                                                                                                             
demonstrates that this result arises from second-best considerations (adjusting the stringency of standards 
serves as a proxy for a tariff), and that the first-best optimum is characterized by diversity of standards. 
4 See Engerman (2003) for a more comprehensive treatment. 
  5standards on moral grounds to improve world welfare.  Conferences and bilateral 
agreements in the second part of the 19
th century did not achieve much in terms of setting 
international standards despite calls for the latter, probably due to a lack of political will.  
Even though bilateral and multilateral agreements on labor issues were signed, enforcement 
of standards was very weak and essentially ineffective.  The creation of the ILO in 1919 
under the League of Nations marks the real beginning of international labor standards.   
Today, the ILO as a specialized agency of the United Nations, and with more than 170 
members (including all countries of the EU), promotes social justice and international labor 
standards worldwide.  It formulates international labor standards in the form of conventions 
and recommendations, and provides technical assistance in a number of areas such as work, 
employment, social security, social policy and related human rights.  The ILO Declaration of 
fundamental principles and rights at work, drafted and adopted in 1998, requires all 
members to observe core labor standards which cover rights pertaining to elimination of 
forced labor, abolition of child labor, non-discrimination in employment and right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining.  These rights are represented by eight ILO 
Conventions, and all the members of the EU have ratified them.   
  Since its creation, the EU has always striven to ensure a decent working environment 
in member countries, establishing minimum standards for working conditions.  Countries 
that are highly regulated cannot impose their standards on those that are not; instead, any 
change in regulation has to come about as a result of interaction among domestic interest 
groups, member states, EU associations, and within the parameters of existing rules.  Under 
the Treaty of Rome of 1958, the six founding members (Belgium, Netherlands, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 We have in mind “efficiency wage” type arguments, in which higher standards (or wages) lead to greater 
productivity (and hence higher ex-ante profits) for firms, as, for instance, better off workers are less likely to 
shirk or be absent due to malnutrition or illness. 
  6Luxembourg, West Germany, France, Italy) agreed to raise employment conditions in 
member states, and changes required a unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers.  As 
membership increased (Denmark, Ireland and UK in 1973; Greece in 1981; Spain and 
Portugal in 1986), more pressures for harmonization resulted but most of them failed to 
result in a change in the policy framework.  Members committed themselves to a social 
agreement in 1972, and the Social Action Program was launched in 1974.  Several directives 
proposed by the European Commission in the 1980s and early 1990s were not approved by 
the Council and only a few are legally binding on member countries.  Those that were 
approved include health and safety requirements in the 1980s and a directive on working 
time arrangements in 1993.   
In the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (the Social Charter), 
member states of the EU committed to some fundamental rights such as freedom to 
organize and bargain collectively, and health and safety in the workplace.  However, since 
changes required unanimous support, the job of the Commission was made extremely 
difficult.  The Charter, which was mainly a political declaration, had no legal force and was 
not binding upon signatory countries.  With the Maastricht Treaty and its Protocol on Social 
Policy in 1992, the EU is now able to intervene, legislate and make changes in worker health 
and safety regulations as long as a qualified majority of member states are in agreement.  
Since the Maastricht Treaty retained the provisions in previous treaties, members were still in 
control of their own right to pay, right to association, and right to strike or impose lockouts.  
The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, now allows qualified majority voting 
in some additional issues (but the rights to association, strike and lockouts are still excluded). 
Even though the dominant view in the 1990s was that integration could only go forward 
  7with harmonization of labor and good markets regulation, some countries (the UK and 
Portugal namely) called for more labor market flexibility.   
At the 2000 European Council meeting in Nice, a European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was signed, but as it stands, these rights are principles rather than 
binding rights. In short, one can argue that EU member states do not harmonize labor 
standards, even though they seem to agree on the lowest common denominator of 
standards.  Even though the EU sets minimum standards, countries have retained most of 
their policy autonomy and diversity.  EU policy pertaining to labor standards remains non-
interventionist, despite the fact that the European Commission has more powers to 
intervene.  Section 4 of the paper will examine the empirical evidence regarding this issue.  
Before conducting our empirical analysis, we will review some of the important existing 
work in this area in the next section.  
 
3.  Literature Review: Theoretical and Empirical 
 
Theoretical work linking international trade with labor standards is relatively scarce.  The 
classic early studies, for instance by Johnson (1969) and Brecher (1974a and 1974b), 
considered minimum wages and their welfare implications but did not consider other 
internationally accepted labor standards such as the number of hours worked, the freedom 
from forced labor or unionization.  On the other hand, Alam (1992), in an unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, was one of the first to provide a more general framework for the 
economic analysis of the impact of labor standards, at constant goods prices, on a country’s 
comparative advantage within the framework of a two-country, two-commodity, two-factor 
model.   
  8Brown  et al. (1996) focused on the welfare and other effects of standards and 
whether it is in a country’s interest to implement common international standards.  They use 
general equilibrium analysis by considering different variants of the standard two-good two-
factor Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model in order to analyse the effects of standards on the 
terms of trade.  The different models in Brown et al. show that the effects of labor standards 
are dependent on the technology of production of goods and standards, and also on whether 
the standards are endogenous.  An important result in their paper is that harmonization of 
standards is not beneficial to high-standard (developed) countries. Economic welfare is 
maximized when countries correct their domestic labor market failures, and since market 
failures are likely to be different across countries and cannot be corrected by similar 
measures, the case for international harmonization of labor standards is rather weak.   
Furthermore, harmonization of labor standards (for example eliminating child labor) can in 
fact unintentionally hurt the people that it is supposed to protect.  Some of these results are 
anticipated as well in unpublished work by Dehejia and Garbo (1994).  Indeed, T. N. 
Srinivasan (1995) has rigorously shown that diversity of standards is consistent with the case 
for free trade.  His analysis shows that international income transfers or domestic 
tax/subsidies can help attain minimum standards (even in the presence of market failures), 
and that the use of trade policies can on the contrary prevent the attainment of better 
standards. This is consonant with the classic Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Johnson “targeting” 
theorem in the theory of commercial policy (see Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and 
Johnson (1965)). 
Dehejia and Samy (2004) have more recently built on the Brown et. al. (1996) analysis 
to investigate formally the links between labor standards and comparative advantage.  Their 
results indicate that countries can benefit or be hurt by a labor standard depending, first, on 
  9whether the latter is imposed in their import or export sector, and, second, on the relative 
factor intensity of the traded goods sector.  More importantly, their model predicts that in 
the absence of coordination, countries will tend to underprovide or overprovide a standard, 
thus failing to reach a world optimum in the presence of trade.  However, it does not 
generally follow that an enforced harmonization of standards will be welfare-improving for 
the world; indeed, the contrary result is more likely. The overall conclusion of the theoretical 
analyses outlined above is that diversity of labor standards between countries should be 
expected, and that such diversity need not be regarded as being unfair as long as labor 
standards are a result of an efficient allocation of resources.   
Since the publication of the OECD (1996) study of Trade, Employment and Labor 
Standards, a number of studies have examined the empirical relationship between trade and 
labor standards, namely whether countries with lower labor standards will tend to gain a 
comparative advantage in trade.  The OECD (1996) study itself examined export 
performance for developed and developing countries versus freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights as proxies for labor standards.  Based mostly on “eyeballing” 
scatterplots, but without a rigorous econometric analysis, it found no evidence that low-
standard countries enjoy a better export performance than high-standard countries.   
Mah (1997) analyzed the relationship between core labor standards and the export 
performance of developing countries in a more rigorous fashion.  More specifically, he 
considered the ratification of ILO conventions related to core labor standards for forty-five 
developing countries as an independent variable to analyze their export performance for 
1993.  Unlike the OECD (1996) study, whose results, as mentioned, were based on looking 
at scatterplots, his regression results showed that ratification of the conventions related to 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, and non-discrimination lead to a deterioration 
  10of export performance.  Similar results are obtained even when a capital cost element is 
added as an additional explanatory variable.  Mah’s results thus contradict the OECD 
findings that there is no relationship between export performance and the level of labor 
standards.  His results are problematic as only conventions ratified are used as indicators for 
labor standards,
6 and no attempt is made to control for other factors that might influence 
competitiveness, which vitiates his econometric methodology. 
Subsequent studies (for example Rodrik (1996), Flanagan (2002), Dehejia and Samy 
(2004)) based on large sample statistical analysis found no (or very weak) evidence that low 
labor standards have an impact on trade.  Instead, trade patterns are determined by the 
natural determinants of comparative advantage in the form of factor endowments (which 
confirms the predictions of standard trade models).  The Flanagan (2004) study is innovative 
in that it uses panel data, but, again, the validity of the results can be questioned as ILO 
conventions are used as proxies for labor standards.  The Rodrik (1996) and Dehejia and 
Samy (2004) studies are more compelling since these authors use a variety of better 
indicators for labor standards.  In addition to ILO conventions ratified, they also consider 
other indicators such as the number of hours worked, rates of occupational injuries, 
unionization rates and estimates of child labor.  Their analysis is comprehensive as it covers 
cross-sectional data for the manufacturing and labor-intensive sectors for many developing 
and developed countries, and they are able to control for the natural determinants of 
comparative advantage.   
D e h e j i a  a n d  S a m y  ( 2 0 0 4 )  a l s o  f i n d  t h a t  l a b o r  s t a n d a r d s  s e e m  t o  p l a y  a  m o r e  
important role for developing countries' trade performance, which is not surprising, given 
that these countries are labor abundant and specialize mostly in labor-intensive goods.  In 
                                                           
6 It is not at all clear that countries which ratify ILO conventions are in fact implementing and enforcing them. 
  11another interesting study, Rodriguez and Samy (2003) using time series data and 
sophisticated econometric techniques have examined the effects of labor standards on US 
export performance.  Because of the existence of structural breaks in the data, they are able 
to examine the influence of labor standards under different regimes, and the evolution of 
this influence over time.  They obtain very weak evidence that low standards help boost 
export competitiveness.
7  Rodriguez and Samy (2003) and Dehejia and Samy (2004) are to 
our knowledge the only studies that have made use of time series data for developed 
countries (Canada and the US) that are members of regional trade agreements. 
  Another study of interest is Van Beers (1998), who considers the relationship 
between labor standards and trade flows of OECD countries using a labor standard 
indicator based on actual labor regulations.  The indicator is a synthetic index constructed by 
the OECD and which takes into account the enforcement of various government 
regulations such as working time, employment contracts, minimum wages and worker’s 
rights.  Van Beers extends a gravity model, which considers bilateral trade flows, with 
variables that represent the strictness of labor regulations and tests the hypothesis whether 
labor standards have a detrimental effect on exports due to a fall in competitiveness.  His 
results based on 1992 data do not show any significant impact of labor standards stringency 
on exports of labor-intensive commodities.  However, when a distinction is made in terms 
of skill-intensities, both the exports of labor-intensive and capital-intensive commodities, 
which are produced with relatively high-skilled labor, deteriorate with an increase in the 
strictness of labor standards.  Van Beers attributes the latter result to the relatively inelastic 
demand for high-skilled labor which implies that labor costs rise more than in the case of 
                                                           
7 There are also a number of studies that have examined the relationship between labor standards and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to verify allegations that countries with lower labor standards are able to attract more 
  12low-skilled labor intensive commodities.  No attempt, however, is made to check the 
robustness of the results for subsequent years, and to use different indicators of labor 
standards for sensitivity analysis. 
  In another study, Krueger (2000) has examined the impact that the EU will have on 
the labor compact,
8 focusing in particular on the race to the bottom hypothesis that 
countries will have to lower their standards to maintain a competitive advantage in trade.  
Overall, his results indicate that even though integration will cause some downward pressure 
on labor market protections (that is, looser regulation), this pressure will be modest, and 
European nations will continue to maintain distinct labor practices as long as they are willing 
to bear the costs of these practices.  Krueger gives several reasons why this should not come 
as a surprise.  First, certain aspects of the labor compact can improve economic efficiency; 
second, imperfect mobility of factor inputs and goods and services will tend to diminish the 
pressure placed on uncompetitive labor practices; and third, for political economy reasons, 
labor legislation within each country is a reflection of what the majority of the public wants.  
  Krueger considers labor mobility among EU countries and argues that it has not 
increased despite the removal of restrictions on labor mobility within the EU.  Furthermore, 
considering immigration over the period 1980-1996, he finds that immigration from non-EU 
countries has declined since 1993 even though these countries are typically characterized by 
lower living standards and weak social protection.  Recent migration data seems to indicate 
that this trend has reversed in the latter patter of the 1990s, with migration from non-EU 
countries on the rise (see Appendix A), while migration across the EU seems to be fairly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
FDI.  The available empirical evidence to date indicates that this is not true and that the opposite is actually 
taking place (see for example, Rodrik (1996)). 
8 Krueger uses the term labor compact to capture the bargain among labor, capital and government, covering 
issues such as pay, social protection, union organization and safety standards. 
  13stable.  In our empirical analysis, we will take a systematic look at the race to the bottom 
hypothesis for a number of indicators of labor standards.   
 
4.  Description of the Data     
 
Using time-series-cross-section (pooled) data over the period 1980-2001 for 15 EU 
countries,
9 we test the proposition that labor standards have an influence on trade (export) 
performance.  Not all of these countries were EU members at the beginning of the time 
period considered but they belonged to other trading arrangements such as the European 
Free Trade Area, and hence one can argue that there were substantial trade linkages among 
them.  Even though European economic integration dates back to the 1950s, the period that 
we cover includes the Single European Act, the Social Charter and the Maastricht Treaty, 
which were all important milestones for the integration process.  Data on manufactured 
exports (lex), GDP, population and size of countries are from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank.  We also have data for exports of manufactured goods within 
the EU, leu, from the OECD trade database over the period 1988-2001, as well as data for 
labor intensive manufactured goods, llabint (both as percentages of GDP and in log form).  
Since labor costs are more important for labor intensive commodities, one would expect 
exports of labor intensive commodities to be relatively low in countries with relatively high 
labor standards.  The human capital variable, lhuman, refers to the average years of education 
of the working-age population as used by Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) with missing values 
obtained from various issues of Education at a Glance, OECD.  
   All of the EU countries mentioned in our sample have ratified the eight core 
(fundamental) conventions on international labor standards.  ILOLEX, which is a database 
  14of international labor standards from the ILO also provides information about the total 
number of conventions ratified by each country and the dates of ratification.  Table 1 below 
summarizes the current situation. There is quite a range in the data with Spain having ratified 
the largest number and Austria the lowest (out of a possible 185 Conventions).  Unlike 
previous studies, however, we do not use the above as an indication of existing standards 
since it is not possible to tell whether these conventions are in fact being enforced.  Instead, 
we use several indicators for labor standards, which are described below. 
Table 1: Total ILO Conventions Ratified by EU-15 Countries 
















United Kingdom  86 
Source: ILOLEX Database, ILO. 
  We consider total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, lsoc, from the 
OECD Social Expenditure Database as one of the indicators for labor standards.  In the 
analysis of convergence of standards, we take into account some of its subdivisions as well, 
namely old-age expenditure and expenditure on unemployment (all as percentages of GDP).  
Public social expenditure includes unemployment benefits and incapacity related benefits, 
which can be conceived as indicators of labor standards in a given country.  All of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 The countries considered are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.     
  15countries in our sample provide social protection such as pensions, unemployment benefits 
and income support schemes.  We consider an overall index of labor market well-being from 
the Centre for the Study of Living Standards, denoted as lwell.  We have data for the latter 
that covers the period 1980-2001 for nine countries in our sample.  The index takes into 
account average returns from work, the aggregate accumulation of human capital, inequality 
in current returns from work, and insecurity in the anticipation of future returns from work.  
The highest level of well-being in 2001 was in Belgium and the lowest in Italy.  Finland 
recorded the largest improvement over the period, while Denmark had the smallest. 
  We consider two indicators for hours worked, lhou and lhour.  The first one refers to 
the number of actual weekly hours worked in the manufacturing sector by wage earners and 
salaried employees, and is obtained from the ILO database LABORSTA.  The second one is 
an index of hours worked from the OECD derived from the average hours worked in a 
given country multiplied by a measure of employment for the country.  It is important to 
note that working time arrangements are either set by law or through collective bargaining 
agreements in most EU member countries, and countries differ in their approach to the 
regulation of working time.  Most countries in our sample have a statutory maximum 
working week of 48 hours (as set in the EU working time directive) or 40 hours.  The only 
exception is Belgium with a maximum working week of 38 hours.  Our data considers the 
actual hours worked as opposed to what the regulations establish.   
Trade union density rates, lunion, are also considered and they are obtained from the 
OECD Labor Market Statistics Database, which are based on surveys or administrative data.    
We also have data on strikes and lockouts, lstr, for most of the countries over the period 
considered, which reflects the ability of workers to express their concerns.  Finally, we 
consider occupational injuries, linj, in the manufacturing sector per thousand people 
  16employed or insured, which is an indicator of safety at the workplace.  As one can imagine, 
none of these indicators are perfect but compared to ILO conventions (which are ratified 
but not necessarily enforced), our indicators measure actual labor regulations. 
  Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables that are used in the empirical 
analysis.  As one can see, we have more observations for lex than leu or llabint, which are the 
three dependent variables that we will use in the three separate sets of regressions (in tables 
3-5 below) for our measure of export performance.  The mean and median values are not 
too different for most variables, and the standard deviations are quite small in most cases.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Name  Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
lex  311 -0.30  -0.25 0.17 
leu  189 -8.77  -8.79 0.61 
llabint  189 -10.24  -10.20 0.69 
lpop  330 4.28 4.28 0.90 
lhuman  294 2.29 2.33 0.17 
lwell  198 -0.59  -0.57 0.12 
lsoc  322 3.14 3.16 0.23 
lhou  270 3.62 3.66 0.10 
lhour  303 4.53 4.56 0.11 
lunion  330 3.64 3.69 0.59 
linj  163 1.40 1.44 0.68 
lstr  259 4.67 5.02 1.95 
Note: All variables are in natural logs. 
 
 
5. Empirical  Analysis 
 
5.1  Labor Standards and Export Performance 
As shown by Brown et al. (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004), theoretically, a labor standard 
that uses some capital and labor (and is therefore an additional cost) may alter a country’s 
comparative advantage depending on the factor intensity of the standard and factor 
endowments of the country (which in turn determine whether the country is an exporter or 
importer of the good affected by the standard).  In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, an 
  17increase in the labor force of a given labor-abundant country (due for example to a reduction 
in the minimum age for employment - which can be conceived as a decrease in labor 
standards), will increase production of the goods that use labor intensively, improving the 
country's comparative advantage in that good.
10  This will also change the terms of trade as a 
result of an increase in export supply and affect the terms of trade of the country's trading 
partner.  It is possible to construct different scenarios that will indicate the trade and welfare 
effects of the standard, namely whether countries gain or lose from the imposition of 
standards.  
Empirically, therefore, it is important to determine whether labor standards can 
affect comparative advantage and hence trade flows as measured by export performance.  As 
seen in section 2 of the paper, studies that have examined this question have considered 
developing countries mostly and the empirical evidence is far from being conclusive.   
Following Rodrik (1996), Mah (1997) and Dehejia and Samy (2004), we use a trade equation 
augmented with labor standard variables to assess the link between labor standards and trade 
performance.  Our general specification is 
Yf X L it it it = (,)
                                                          
 (1)   
where   is manufactured exports (lex) of country i at time t as a fraction of country i’s 
merchandise exports at time t;
Y it
11  refers to a vector of variables that proxy for the natural 
determinants of comparative advantage; and  refers to any of the proxies for labor 
standards outlined in the previous section.  In particular, we will use the working-age 




10 This is what is commonly known in the trade literature as the Rybczynski (1955) effect. 
11 We also consider an alternate definition of the dependent variable which is manufactured exports to EU (leu) 
countries only as a fraction of GDP, calculated from bilateral trade data obtained from the OECD trade 
database. 
  18(lhuman) as our X’s to proxy for the labor/land ratio and human capital respectively.  Both of 
these variables are expected to be positively related to the dependent variable.   
The maximum coverage in our data spans the period 1980-2001, and the maximum 
number of countries in our sample is fifteen, depending on data availability.  In effect we 
have an unbalanced panel since we do not have full observations for all countries.  The 
functional form that we use is a log-linear version of the above general specification where 
all variables are measured in natural logarithms: 
ln ln ln YX L it o it it i it =+ + ++ β β β µ ε 12  (2) 
The country fixed effect isµi and εit  is the normal disturbance term.  The fixed 
effect model is normally preferred because it takes into account time-invariant unobservable 
country heterogeneity, which is possibly correlated with the dependent variable.   
Furthermore, it is usually recommended when the number of groups (countries) is less than 
the number of time periods (years).  However, a Hausman test was employed to compare 
the fixed and random effects estimates of coefficients and equation (1) estimated 
accordingly.  One would expect, as the conventional wisdom holds, that low-standard 
countries will enjoy a better export performance than high-standard countries because of 
lower costs.  In fact, as shown by Rodrik (1996), labor standards are significant determinants 
of labor costs when allowance is made for productivity.  There is also the possibility, 
however, that labor standards can improve the production process, encourage workers to 
perform better, and improve productivity.  For example, providing workers with more safety 
at the workplace may induce them to perform better.  The overall effect on export 
performance may therefore not be as clear as expected, and hence we have no a priori on the 
sign of β2.        
  19  Tables 3-5 show the results when equation (2) is estimated using various indicators 
of labor standards.  In table 3, the dependent variable is manufactured exports as a 
percentage of total exports (in natural logs) and the Hausman test provided strong evidence 
against the null hypothesis that there is no misspecification in the case of random effects.  As 
a result, fixed effects estimates are reported with panel corrected standard errors.
12  




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant -5.292**  -7.580** -5.399** -6.388** -4.602** -4.632  -6.039**
  (-10.077) (-7.574) (-10.896) (-12.586) (8.131)  (-7.559) (-11.648)
         
lpop  1.110** 1.585** 1.159** 1.124** 0.975** 0.922** 1.346** 
  (7.267) (7.032) (8.050) (7.533) (6.035) (4.597) (9.056) 
         
lhuman  0.116*  0.130 0.191** 0.086 0.146**  0.318** 0.059 
  (1.636) (0.982) (2.524) (1.249) (2.015) (2.897) (0.859) 
         
lwell  -  0.007  - - - - - 
  -  (0.064)  - - - - - 
         
lsoc  - -  -0.090** - - - - 
  - -  (-2.929)  - - - - 
         
lhour  - - -  0.240**  - - - 
  - - -  (3.754)  - - - 
         
lunion  - - - -  -0.050** - - 
  - - - -  (-3.852)  - - 
         
linj  - - - - -  -0.010  - 
  - - - - -  (-1.026)  - 
         
lstr  - - - - - -  -0.003 
  - - - - - -  (-0.666) 
         
N  294 189 286 270 294 156 249 
Adj.  R-squared  0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.92 
         
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
 
                                                           
12 F-Tests were also performed to determine whether cross-section or period dummies were to be included in 
the different regressions, and the equation estimated accordingly.  Dummy variables for membership in the 
EFTA, EC, and EU were also considered but did not change the results considerably. 
  20We recognize that not all the countries in our sample were members of the EU at the 
beginning of the sample period, even though they were part of other free trade 
arrangements.  Estimating the equation for different time periods, to take into account the 
fact that some of the countries joined later, would have reduced the degrees of freedom 
considerably.  Instead, we tried to capture these effects by using dummy variables for 
membership, which did not change the results reported here significantly.   As we can see 
from table 3 above, the natural determinants of comparative advantage represented by lpop 
and lhuman are significant in most of the regressions with the right sign.  Three (lsoc, lhou and 
lunion) of the six labor standards variables confirm the conventional wisdom that labor 
standards matter and have a negative effect on export performance while the other three 
indicators are insignificant.  In table 4, we use manufactured exports to EU countries as a 
percentage of GDP (in logs) as our dependent variable, and the Hausman test favored the 
random effects model over the fixed effects one.  Since our data for exports to EU member 
countries covers a shorter period, we have fewer observations in these regressions.  In this 
case, lhuman is significant but not lpop, suggesting possibly that exports are concentrated in 
manufactured goods that are more capital intensive.  Once again, three of the labor 
standards indicators (lwell, lsoc, lhou) are significant and the remaining three are not.   
However, only lhou confirms the conventional wisdom whereas lwell and lsoc point in the 
opposite direction.   





  21Table 4: Panel Data Estimates for Equation 2 – Dependent Variable leu 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant  -13.888** -11.719** -14.766** -15.712** -14.723** -14.092** -14.320**
  (-17.515) (-7.861) (-16.645) (-17.526) (-16.117) (-16.338)  (-17.423)
         
lpop  -0.059 0.114 -0.011 -0.103 -0.005 -0.127 0.005 
  (-0.374) (1.041) (-0.067) (-0.729) (-0.035) (-0.921) (0.032) 
         
lhuman  2.305** 1.356** 2.132** 2.295** 2.353** 2.513** 2.436** 
  (10.024)  (2.761) (9.630) (8.229) (10.717) (8.439) (10.115) 
         
lwell  -  1.289**  - - - - - 
  -  (2.719)  - - - - - 
         
lsoc  - -  0.338**  - - - - 
  - -  (3.291)  - - - - 
         
lhou  - - -  0.563**  - - - 
  - - -  (3.241)  - - - 
         
lunion  - - - -  0.139  - - 
  - - - -  (1.334)  - - 
         
linj  - - - - -  0.005  - 
  - - - - -  (0.147)  - 
         
lstr  - - - - - -  -0.013 
  - - - - - -  (-0.887) 
         
N  175 117 175 151 175 101 152 
Adj.  R-squared 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.71 0.50 
         
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
 
Finally, table 5 above shows the results when the dependent variable, llabint, refers to 
labor intensive commodities as a percentage of GDP.  In this case, the Hausman test 
favored a random effects model.  The human capital variable is significant with the right sign 
in most regressions but the proxy for the labor/land ratio is not.  As for the labor standard 
variables, lsoc and lunion are positive and significant, indicating that higher standards are in 
fact related to an improvement in exports of labor intensive goods, which is contrary to the 
  22conventional wisdom.  We also estimated equations with capital intensive manufactures as a 
percentage of GDP as our dependent variable (results not shown here).  Not surprisingly, 
the human capital variable is highly significant (with t-statistics greater than 10 in most cases) 
while the proxy for the labor/land ratio is less significant than in table 5 above.  Two of the 
labor standards (lsoc and lwell) were in disagreement with the conventional wisdom while lhou 
and lstr confirmed it.   
Table 5: Panel Data Estimates for Equation 2 – Dependent Variable llabint 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant  -11.678** -11.177** -12.491** -12.497** -13.549** -13.237** -13.071**
  (-13.315) (-6.482) (-13.032) (-11.632) (-13.849) (-11.979)  (-13.980)
         
lpop  -0.307*  -0.180 -0.266  -0.320*  -0.174 -0.297 -0.228 
  (-1.830) (-1.379) (-1.631) (-1.890) (-1.230) (-1.284) (-1.271) 
         
lhuman  1.189**  0.819  1.028** 1.174** 1.263** 1.822** 1.636** 
  (4.556) (1.444) (3.999) (3.626) (5.101) (5.371) (6.000) 
         
lwell  -  0.462  - - - - - 
  -  (0.823)  - - - - - 
         
lsoc  - -  0.318**  - - - - 
  - -  (2.742)  - - - - 
         
lhou  - - -  0.249  - - - 
  - - -  (1.175)  - - - 
         
lunion  - - - -  0.316**  - - 
  - - - -  (2.737)  - - 
         
linj  - - - - -  -0.005  - 
  - - - - -  (-0.114)  - 
         
lstr  - - - - - -  0.017 
  - - - - - -  (1.105) 
         
N  175 117 175 151 175 101 152 
Adj.  R-squared 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.46 0.21 
         
Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
  23Overall, therefore, we obtain very mixed evidence regarding the conventional 
wisdom, but the fact remains that trade (export) performance is still primarily determined by 
relative factor endowments and not labor standards.  Our results therefore confirm those of 
Rodrik (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004), who used cross-sectional data for large samples 
consisting of both developed and developing countries.  Since our primary interest was to 
consider the individual effects of standards, Tables 3-5 report results when one labor 
standard is introduced at a time.  Considering all the indicators together reduces the degrees 
of freedom considerably, and one has to be mindful of multicollinearity among the 
standards.  We have nonetheless tried this and it turns out that the results are not 
significantly altered when different combinations of standards are introduced
13.  Export 
performance continues to be determined by the natural determinants of comparative 
advantage, and we obtain mixed evidence regarding the conventional wisdom.  As a further 
robustness check, we considered shorter time periods for our pooled data (and certain 
specific years at regular intervals pooled together); again, the overall results did not change 
significantly, even though we had fewer degrees of freedom.        
5.2  Race to the Bottom? 
Whether one looks at trade or foreign direct investment flows, it is quite obvious 
that the EU has been characterized by increased integration over the past two decades.  This 
section addresses the issue that increased economic integration will restrict the ability of 
national governments to set independent policy choices, in our case, the choice over labor 
standards.  The extreme version of this thesis, which we have alluded to in the introduction, 
is that governments will be forced into a “race to the bottom” in order to remain 
competitive.  Following the seminal work of Viner (1950), it is now widely agreed that the 
                                                           
13 This is also carried out in Rodrik (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004) for example. 
  24overall effects of removing trade barriers on welfare depends on the magnitudes of trade 
creation and diversion.  The empirical literature which has tried to quantify these welfare 
effects has in general shown that trade creation dominates, in the case of the EU, such that 
welfare effects are positive overall (Lloyd 1992).  It can thus be expected that trade creation 
will improve working conditions as there is likely to be a positive relationship between 
working conditions and the level of economic development in the long run, since higher 
labor standards are presumably a “normal” good demand for which will rise with income.  
Thus, to the extent that economic integration raises welfare, labor standards will improve 
over time.  Further, even if some standards are low in a given country, this may not improve 
its competitiveness if other standards are higher; in other words, differences in labor 
standards across a given country may persist.   
Even though integration is more likely to improve labor standards and welfare for 
participating members, the following possible costs of integration need to be taken into 
account.  Neoclassical trade theory predicts that in the absence of redistributive mechanisms, 
the benefits of trade liberalization are likely to be shared unevenly among individuals.   
Specifically, the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that for economies with an 
abundant supply of skilled labor, integration may lead to a fall in wages and, by extension, 
working conditions of the unskilled, to the extent that degraded standards substitute for 
lower wages in a world of nominal wage stickiness (OECD 1994).  The free movement of 
capital flows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) may also exert some pressures 
on labor standards.  If investment indeed flows to countries with relatively lower labor 
standards, this may create downward pressures on labor standards in other members of the 
EU, and hence lead to “social dumping”.  To the extent that workers will migrate to high 
standard countries in order to take advantage of better social protection, this could lead to 
  25smaller benefits in countries where social protection is generous.  Furthermore, the use of a 
common currency (the EURO) by most EU members and the resulting loss of monetary 
policy as a policy instrument to offset macroeconomic shocks, may mean more swings in the 
business cycle, and hence an increase in social insurance and labor market regulation.   
Finally, in order to belong to the EMU, countries must maintain low and stable debts, which 
may lead them to cut social expenditure.  In sum, for all the reasons mentioned above, 
although economic integration may be expected to improve labor standards overall, the 
possibility of social dumping because of stronger international competition needs to be taken 
into account, and there is, in principle, ambiguity on the predicted sign and magnitude of the 
effect. 
  We therefore consider the evolution of labor standards in the EU over the years 
1980-2001, which includes the Single European Act of 1985, the Social Charter of 1989, and 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, all of which led to important reductions in restrictions.   
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996), the empirical growth 
literature distinguishes between two types of convergence: “σ-convergence” and “β-
convergence”.  When the dispersion of a variable across a control group falls over time, 
there is said to be σ-convergence; on the other hand, β-convergence refers to a situation in 
which the partial correlation between a given variable over time and its initial level is 
negative.
14  In this paper we explore whether or not σ-convergence in labor standards is 
occurring across EU member countries, as this is the germane definition for our purposes. 
A cursory look at the data reveals a rather mixed picture.  Table 5 below reports 
changes in (proxies for) labor standards over the past two decades.  As can be seen, there 
have been considerable improvements in labor standards represented by the index of labor 
  26market well-being, total social spending, old age benefits, and safety at the workplace 
(occupational injuries).   However, there have been declines in trade union density over the 
whole period and an increase in hours worked in the 1990s (even if not in all countries).  
Overall, the results are not as grim as the conventional wisdom would have it; even though 
integration may impose constraints on domestic policy, they are evidently not as severe as 
the pessimists would have predicted. 
Table 5: Evolution of Labor Standards in the EU 
Labor Standard Variable  Change from 
1980 to 1989 (%) 
Change from 
1990 to 2001 (%) 
Index of Labor Market Well-Being  9.5037  (7+, 2-)  11.4016 (9+, 0-) 
 
Social Spending (% of GDP) 
a) Total 
b) Old Age Benefits 
c) Unemployment Benefits 
 
7.6561 (12+, 2-) 
8.9279 (10+, 4-) 
32.3270 (11+, 3-) 
 
2.5721 (10+, 5-) 
11.4035 (12+, 3-) 
-21.0929 (4+, 11-) 
 
Hours Worked 
a) Actual Hours Worked in Manufacturing 
b) Index of Hours Worked 
 
 
-2.0664 (6+, 7-) 
-1.8546 (7+, 7-) 
 
 
4.7749 (6+, 7-) 
6.0105 (10+, 5-) 
 
Trade Union Density  -10.7896 (3+, 12-)  -10.9958 (3+, 12-) 
 
Occupational Injuries  -28.3019 (2+, 5-)  -26.0736 (0+, 9-) 
 
Strikes and Lockouts  -40.7985 (2+, 11-)   1.5523 (2+, 11-) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on available data for EU-15.  The data is averaged over the relevant period 
before calculating percentage changes.  The numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of countries in the 














                                                                                                                                                                             
14 This is more commonly known as conditional β-convergence.  
  27Table 6: Sigma-Convergence/Divergence 
 
Labor Standard  1980  1990  2000 
Index of Labor Market Well-Being 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on available data for EU-15 
 
  28Table 6 above reports means and standard deviations for the labor standards 
variables for 1980, 1990 and 2000.  In the case of the index of labor market well being, social 
spending (and its sub-categories), occupational injuries, the means have increased and there 
are smaller variations around them.  For trade union density and strikes and lockouts, the 
means have gone down, but the variations around the means have increased.  Hours worked 
have remained fairly stable.  Based on standard deviations, we have evidence of both σ-
convergence and σ-divergence.  The problem, however, with the previous interpretation, is 
that it ignores changes in the means of the distributions, which is obvious from the numbers 
reported in Table 5.  As a result, we report coefficients of variation and interpret a fall in this 
variable as further evidence of σ-convergence.  Once again, the evidence is mixed as we 
observe convergence in the index of labor market well-being, social spending (and its sub-





This paper has examined the effects of labor standards on export performance of countries 
that are part of the European Union by employing panel data over the period 1980 to 2001.  
In so doing, we have tried to test the conventional wisdom that countries with lower labor 
standards will experience an improvement in export competitiveness.  Our empirical 
estimates indicate some evidence in favor of the conventional wisdom, although overall 
labor standards appear to exert less of an influence on export performance than the 
traditional determinants of comparative advantage predicted by neoclassical trade theory.  
This is. in our view. a significant contribution to both the literature on economic integration 
in the EU, and on the competitive effects of labor standards in general, as the majority of 
empirical studies, cited in the introduction, use cross-sectional data and are perforce unable 
  29to exploit movements in labor standards over time.  Our study thus represents a substantial 
methodological improvement. We have also examined the issue of convergence of standards 
across countries to try to shed some light on the race to the bottom argument.  Our results 
point towards convergence in some standards and divergence in others, suggesting that on 
this important question, the jury is still very much out. 
  In the European context, in recent years, there has been much discussion and a 
number of studies delving into the social consequences of EU enlargement, a natural 
question as the ten new members are at fairly different (and generally lower) levels of 
economic development compared to the EU-15 countries.  It would be interesting to 
examine current and historical labor regulations in these countries, as well as trade flows to 
ascertain the veracity of the arguments linking trade and labor standards, as well as the race 
to the bottom hypothesis.  There is, regrettably, as yet insufficient data to explore these 
hypotheses, given the very recent accession of the ten new members. Based on the results in 
this paper, however, we can conjecture that trade flows will continue to be determined 
mostly by the natural determinants of comparative advantage, and, looking at the current 
political economy, that countries will choose their own social policies (including labor 
standards) based mostly on domestic considerations. Formal tests of these conjectures await 
the advent of new data of sufficient quality and quantity. 
In the context of the empirical trade literature, it would also be interesting to see 
how, if at all, our results change when testing alternative trade models, such as the gravity 
model, with the different indicators of labor standards used in this paper, as well as 
disaggregated trade data for manufactured goods that takes into account skill intensity.   
Furthermore, a systematic evaluation of β-convergence for standards would also allow us to 
  30check whether the race to the bottom holds when other factors that affect standards are 
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